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MAN-RATING THE GEMINI-TITAN II AIR FORCE LAUNCH VEHICLE
By Haggai Cohen
Martin Company
Baltimore f Maryland
Summary
The paper examines the disciplines and new approaches being utilized
which together comprise the "Man-Rated" Gemini-Titan II Air Force Launch
Vehicle Program, It discusses the critical component program; the technical
and specialized skill training and certification program; the Quality Systems
Engineering approach; the advanced corrective action and failed parts analysis
program; the classification of characteristics program established for fabrica
tion and test; the workmanship discipline approach; individual performance
measurement; the Zero Defects program; personnel motivation; Air Force Space
Systems Division disciplines imposed by the "Pilot Safety Program"; the
limited life component program; the procurement controls imposed; and finally,
an evaluation of the effectiveness of this "Man-Rated" approach.
Man-Rating in Design
Man-rating is defined as the marshalling of the disciplines necessary to
achieve a satisfactory probability of crew (astronaut) survival. Technically,
this probability may be expressed in terms of reliability of the launch vehicle
and reliability of the Malfunction Detection and Escape System. Mathematically,
these terms are linked in the equation PCS = RLV + (1-RLV }

D

E

where:
P~~ = Probability of crew survival
Oo
R v = Reliability of launch vehicle
and ^ = Reliability of the Malfunction Detection and Escape System.
It can be seen that to maximize probability of crew survival, careful
attention must be given to such launch vehicle items as:
(1) Use of redundancy to improve launch vehicle reliability.
(2) Design of a reliable Malfunction Detection System based on analysis
of launch vehicle failure modes.
(3) Utilization of the crew as part of the Malfunction Detection System.
(k) Designing a vehicle checkout program which minimizes the probability
of launching a defective vehicle.
(5) Utilization of a disciplined Quality & Reliability Assurance Program
to prevent degradation of inherent design reliability.
Malfunction Detection System
The MDS monitors launch vehicle parameters that affect crew safety. It
actuates lights and meters in the spacecraft which, in display form, warn the
astronauts of potential dangers or malfunctions. The Gemini MDS was designed
to make maximum use of the astronaut's decision-making capabilities which re
sulted in a system of increased reliability and simplicity. It is a manual
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abort system whereby the astronauts, from the displayed performance parameters f
determine if abort action is required. The choice of performance parameters
was based on careful analysis of modes of failure, probability of these failures
to occur, times to catastrophe, and crew reaction time at various phases of the
boost flight. The parameters selected for display are:
Engine thrust chamber pressures for both vehicle stages,
Tank pressures on all tanks in vehicle,
Overrates in pitch, yaw and roll,
Staging sequence,
Switchover from primary to secondary flight control system.
The MDS was designed with full sensor redundancy, redundant power supply
circuits, separated installations of primary and secondary system elements,
and fail safe design and hook-up to minimize possibility of signalling a false
malfunction.
Flight Control System
During the course of conducting the failure mode analyses, one particular
ly critical type of failure evolved - that of an engine "hard-over" during
Stage I flight approaching "Max Q". At this point, structural break-up would
occur in approximately one second. This is obviously too rapid for the manual
abort philosophy which requires time for detection, reaction, escape initiation
and actual escape. It was determined that a way out of the dilemma was to
radically reduce the likelihood of a "hard-over" engine condition by adding a
redundant flight control system to the launch vehicle*
The redundant system utilizes a primary string of a three-axis reference
system (with integral programmer), a radio guidance system, an autopilot, rate
gyros, and a hydraulic system feeding a newly designed tandem or dual actuator*
The secondary system utilizes the inertial guidance system of the spacecraft*,
a secondary autopilot, secondary rate gyros and an independent secondary hydraul
ic system feeding the alternate side of the tandem actuator.
Switchover is automatically accomplished if any of the following malfunc
tions occur during Stage I flight.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(k)

Loss of hydraulic pressure in the primary hydraulic system.
Engine thrust chamber movement to "hard-over" position.
Excessive turning rates in any of the three (3) axes.
Manual command of crew.

Since dynamic pressures are much reduced during Stage II flight, the "hardover" condition is no longer critical then. As a result, no redundant hydraulic
or tandem actuators are used in Stage II. However, switchover of the remainder
of the system is automatically accomplished if turning rates are excessive in
pitch, yaw or roll or by manual selection of the crew.
Electrical System
The electrical system was designed with redundancies in all major circuits*
There are two separate power buses fed by individual batteries. These alternate
supplies are fed to such components as:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
O)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Program initiate relays
kO second time delay relays (lockout spacecraft shutdown)
Staging control relays
Staging switches
Explosive separation nuts
Stage I & II engine shutdown circuits
Guidance shutdown relay for Stage II
Manual booster shutdown switches
Range safety equipment
Critical Component Program

An important element in the Gemini Quality program was the establishment
of a critical component program to prevent degradation of inherent reliability
by means of "tender loving care. ff A review of the airborne components was
made, and utilizing the selection criteria shown below, 5^ items were designa
ted as critical*
(1)

failure modes associated with the component design and application
will result in vehicle mission failure and crew abort*

(2)

failure modes associated with the component design and application
will significantly decrease the probability of mission success*

(3)

failure of the component during countdown will result in a hold or
kill and prevent meeting launch window required for rendezvous
mission*
The component is a design unique to Gemini and has no previous manned
vehicle application*.

The selection criteria were also supplied to the manufacturers of the 5^
critical components with the requirement to review and select the piece parts
of the component which should be classified as critical. These piece parts
lists were then reviewed, negotiated and finally approved by the Martin Relia
bility Group and the Air Force* The following controls were then instituted
on the resulting hundreds of piece parts.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(*f)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

Identify critical parts with tags, decals, etc*
Segregate critical parts so that they cam be more carefully handled*
Institute special MRB (Material Review Board) procedures to carefully
control repair or rework of critical parts*
Prohibit acceptance of parts which have exhibited transient mal
functions unless a conclusive reason and conclusive repair can be
found*
Control changes to design and manufacturing processes to maintain
qualification configuration*
Provide planned storage and handling to minimize damage*
Provide prompt, detailed failure analysis and corrective action on
failed critical parts, but obtain Martin permission for corrective
action affecting design or processes since this constitutes a con
figuration change*
Indoctrinate personnel handling critical parts in the above require
ments*
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Martin
Source inspect critical components, utilizing resident
part require
Quality personnel to audit for adherence to critical
ments*
requirements with each
(10) Provide certificate of compliance with above
shipment of critical components.
s fabricated
The above controls have also been instituted on component
an awareness of the
within Martin and the entire program has resulted in
reports
trouble
of
number
The
Program.
Gemini
special requirements of the
for example, reflects very
written on critical components at the launch site,
parts*
little difficulty with critical
(9)

Training & Certification
Selection of Personnel
was utilization
A prime objective in the selection of Gemini personnelvehicle testing,
of Titan experience. This was especially true in design,
, therefore f
selection
fabrication and launch crew operations. The initial personnel. This group
ed
factored in a group of highly trained and experienc
personnel
the
all
then
was supplemented by additional qualified people and orientation, safety
were processed through a carefully planned series of r individual and his
and technical training courses suited to the particula
evaluation of the absorp
planned assignment. The courses culminated in an
ce on-the-job. The
tion of training by means of test scores and of performanly competent "to perform
technical
member
team
end result is to have every Gemini
contribution to the Gemini
his job, have him understand the importance of his
Program to the country*
program, and the importance of the objectives of the
on the Gemini team*
Certification cards are awarded to each trained man
members 11 are performing
Quality personnel make certain that only "card carrying
Gemini tasks*
launch site because
A special on-the-job training program exists at the
Special training
of the requirements to work together as a launch team*
hazardous operations
g
exercises have been run in loading propellants, simulatinaddition to individual
in
or safety problems. Crew certification has resulted,
in the form of
certification, and this program has paid handsome dividends
.
smooth, disciplined and coordinated countdown exercises
divisions, ad
Certification boards, consisting of managers of operating
high standards demanded by
minister the certification program and maintain the
the program*
Motivation
attitude of each
Much emphasis has been placed towards developing the
nts of the highest
member of the Gemini team towards his job. The requiremeperfection, the develop
standards of workmanship, the need for striving towards
astronaut visits;
ment of pride in workmanship have been stressed utilizing es of team members,
automobil
special Gemini stickers on equipments, decals for
coats with Gemini
shop
or
coveralls
posters,
ve
special Gemini pins; imaginati
the Martin newspaper are a
insignia, and a constant program of articles using
few of the motivation techniques being utilized.
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An additional, intensive motivational campaign has been instituted in
the form of "Zero Defects". This program instituted a series of defect goals,
which become more stringent with time, and against which measured defects are
plotted. The program embraces all phases of activity including non-hardware
support areas. Award programs have begun, both on an individual and department
al basis. The main point of the entire campaign is the cons taint reminder that
there are no "insignificant mistakes" on the Gemini Man-Rated Program.
The trouble reporting system has been modified to print out on an auto
mated tab run the badge numbers of individuals contributing to operator errors
resulting in hardware discrepancies* This tab run aids in determining addit
ional training requirements or, in extreme cases, de-certification of Gemini
team members.
Limited Life Program
An operating life test program begun on the Titan program was continued
on the Gemini program. In general, life test data was used in conjunction with
qualification test data, together with mode of failure analysis and failure
histories to arrive at a maximum operating life limit for selected time sensi
tive components. These limits are then used as a basis for rejection if actual
operating hours exceed the limit established. An automated equipment time re
cording system is in operation which starts to operate during acceptance test
ing at the supplier's facility, continues through receiving inspection and
bench testing at Martin, through sub-system, system and combined systems test
ing in the factory and at the launch site. System operating times are obtained
from specially designed multi-channel recorders. The tab run prints out by
part number, and by serial number, the actual and accumulated operating hours
with identification to various test phases in which the time was accumulated.
A refurbishment plan is under negotiation which allows for increases in
operating life based upon careful replacement of selected time or wear sensi
tive piece parts, followed by a retesting program*
The limits that were selected are conservative and in consonance with the
Gemini reliability goals.
Quality Systems Engineering
A Quality Systems Engineering Group was established on Gemini by assign
ing competent professional engineers to the various sub-systems of the vehicle
at the beginning of the design effort. These engineers participate^ in draw
ing reviews, specification preparations, vendor selections, qualification and
acceptance test procedure reviews, design reviews, etc* In particular, they
Were assigned the following major tasks:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Maintain a continuous study of assigned system to permit technically
competent decisions in following tasks*
Review specifications (contract, test, procurement), for addition of
Quality Assurance provisions.
Review test, maintenance and operating procedures for adherence to
specifications for adequacy and for selection of key check points.
Review and approve Qualification, Acceptance and Production Monitor
ing test procedures and reports from suppliers and for in-house
testing.
Examine and approve specification deviations and waivers, Material
Review Board reports and minor variation review reports* This was
done to increase the technical level in decision-making associated
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(6)
(7)
(8)

with non-conformances.
Review engineering changes with an emphasis on establishing retro
fit inspection and test plans to restore hardware to its pre-change
integrity.
Participate in test team operation to review adequacy of selection
of ke^y check points (item 3 above) and to perform on-the-spot
failure analysis on test anomalies*
Analyze and accept for Quality, test results, telemetry data, land
line recordings, etc*

This group is currently performing the bulk of the Corrective Action
problem investigations and supplying technical liaison with the team of resi
dent field inspectors*
Quality Classification of Characteristics Program
Because of the utilization of existing Titan engineering as a base for the
Gemini design and since Titan did not have a classification of characteristics
program, the Quality Engineering Group on Gemini carried out an informal class
ification on fabrication process plans and test procedures. Utilizing criteria
established for this specific purpose, critical characteristics were highlighted
for special attention and data documentation by line inspection personnel.
These special requirements were integrated into the manufacturing planning so
that they were highlighted also for the fabricators and testers as well.
Procurement Controls
In the early stages of the design effort, a special set of procurement
specifications were prepared which covered reliability requirements such as
trouble reporting, equipment operating time recording, failure analyses, failed
parts analyses, design reviews; critical component requirements; data and docu
mentation requirements such as format and content needs of qualification and
acceptance test procedures and reports. These specifications were referenced
as applicable in the individual procurement drawings and the extent of these
references reviewed by Reliability and Quality Engineering.
In placement of business with new suppliers, bid evaluation was performed
by Design Engineering, Reliability, Quality Engineering and Procurement.
Acceptance and Qualification procedures prepared by the suppliers were
reviewed and approved by Martin before testing could proceed. Test Reports
were then reviewed and accepted similarly.
Detailed contractor acceptance plans were prepared by Quality Engineering
for use by resident Quality personnel. These are inspection instructions em
bracing process reviews, quality system audits, hardware audits, specification
compliance requirements and test procedure data.
Vendor workshops were planned and carried out during which the special
requirements of the Gemini Program were explained and discussed. Interface
problems were aired and corrective action instituted as required. These
sessions served greatly in bringing these suppliers into the Gemini team with
increased enthusiasm, cooperation and understanding.
A continuous system of audits in suppliers houses is serving as an impetus
to keep the rigid controls in active force.
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Vehicle Chaperones
To assure continuous compliance with contract, specifications and draw
ings, a Quality Assurance expert is assigned to each launch vehicle as chaperone* He begins with the tank fabrication at Martin-Denver, conducts the tank
roll-out inspection there, travels with the tanks to Martin-Baltimore, remains
with the launch vehicle through final assembly and vertical tests, is respon
sible for acceptance of vehicle documentation during the Acceptance Team
exercise at completion of vertical tests, accompanies the vehicle to Cape
Kennedy, observes stowage of the vehicle during flight, verifies loading and
unloading operations, participates in the receiving inspection at the Gape and
observes the flight test preparations. He maintains a historical record of
significant problems, their applicability to his vehicle and their resolution*
Since he is the one individual who devotes full time to a particular vehicle,
he is best equipped to have readily available the major problems that have
occurred during fabrication, inspection, shipment and testing*
Pilot Safety Program
The major function of the Air Force Space Systems Division/Aerospace Pilot
Safety Program is to ensure that the concern for crew safety is contained in
launch vehicle planning, is reflected in appropriate activities, and that the
Tehicle history is well documented and thoroughly assessed prior to launch. It
is implemented by a continuous technical monitoring of all phases of the pro
gram from design through launch. It is also implemented by concentrated reviews
at key focal points in the build-test-accept sequence. The areas that are
rigorously reviewed are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

Engineering design
Development testing
Engineering changes
Production plans and processes
Inspection
Testing
Handling
Acceptance activities
Launch operations
Configuration documentation
Test data and procedural reviews
Corrective action status and problem resolutions*

Stringent requirements are imposed during the acceptance phase and hard
ware is not accepted until Air Force Space Systems Division and Aerospace are
convinced that the hardware and documentation comply with specifications and
contractual requirements* This acceptance is characterized by a methodical f
uncompromising attitude*
Holl-Out Inspection
This is the first major inspection conducted upon completion of tank
fabrication at Martin-Denver. The Air Force review covers tank weld informa
tion, significant problem history, laboratory tests on materials, stress
analyses on weld repairs or discrepancies, and a Hwalk-aroundff inspection to
make certain there-are no doubts as to the man-rated quality of the vehicle
tanks*
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Vehicle Acceptance
Upon completion of all sub-system and system testing in Martin-Baltimore,
a Vertical Acceptance Team conducts a comprehensive review of hardware logs,
test results, observes combined systems test and audits the assembled hardware*
The team assures that the following criteria has been met:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(*O

Completion of satisfactory component, sub-system, system and all
systems acceptance test.
Completion of documentation of hardware status including history and
identification of components by serial number, test data, configura
tion status and problem areas encountered, together with their
resolution*
Special detailed report containing critical component history.
Completion review (no vehicle or spares shortages).

Flight Safety Review
A similar review is conducted by the Flight Safety Review Board just prior
to flight and constitutes the final activity of the Pilot Safety Program by
making the final decision of committing the booster to launch*
This review covers the following areas:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(*f)
(5)
(6)

Significant details of previous Gemini and Titan launches.
Modifications to hardware, mission and procedures since previous
review.
History of launch vehicle through production, acceptance and AMR
activities.
Report and recommendations of the Launch Vehicle Status Review Board.
Complete technical review of the significant problem areas.
Report on personnel changes of the launch crew and status of flight
readiness teams.

Following the above review, the FSRB decides whether or not to commit
the vehicle to launch and presents this decision to the senior NASA representa
tive for his concurrence or rejection.
Corrective Action and Failure Analysis Program
In adding man-rating to the trouble reporting - corrective action loop,
the most important changes are:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Generation and utilization of trouble report data from all possible
applicable sources.
A problem investigation of all actual and potential problems, with
emphasis on striking the words "random failure 11 from the vocabulary*
A planned corrective action loop embracing Martin-Denver, AMR and all
Gemini suppliers which directs necessary corrective action in careful
detail with authority to carry it through.
Detailed problem documentation and disposition decisions for each
trouble report. Note that each report and problem is reviewed and
the disposition concurred with by SSD/Aerospace.
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(5)

Failed parts analyses carried to sufficient depth by experts in this
technique, utilizing new non-destructive testing techniques to firm
ly establish mechanism and failure cause. This includes dissection
of piece parts such as diodes, capacitors f potted modules, etc*

Because of similarity of design, Titan sources of data are utilized to
a great degree*
Open problems are added as constraints to significant PERT events and
hence get top management attention and pressure for resolution*
Speed of response of suppliers in carrying out failed parts analyses is
a major problem in maintaining rapidity of response to open problems* It
should be noted that all open problems must be reviewed and a determination
made whether or not to proceed with the next key PERT event* It is especially
important that the number of open problems be small prior to a Flight Safety
Review Board or a Vehicle Acceptance Team Meeting*
Evaluation of Benefits Gained from Man-Rated Program
Many benefits of the above program are starting to appear quite clearly.
Some of these are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

The Gemini-Titan II Launch Vehicle will have all components fully
qualified prior to flight*
The number of hardware failures on airborne components at AMR is
significantly low*
The difficulties encountered in testing procedures, ground equipment
interfaces, facility interfaces, were significantly low for the first
launch vehicle*
Test schedules were set and could be adhered to because of comparative
freedom from major problems*
EEI (Electrical/Electronic Interference) problems have been at a minimum,
Air Force confidence has been high because of depth of response and
scope of problem coverage*
Marked inroads in area of vendor control have been pioneered on this
program with resulting higher reliability hardware*
An unprecedented position of value and contribution to success of the
program has been achieved by the Quality and Reliability Groups*
Full spares support of qualified hardware was available at AMR to •
support the first launch vehicle on schedule*
A complement of highly trained and motivated personnel are available
to continue the efforts accomplished to date*
Interfaces with associate contractors on the Program have been firmly
established and cooperation is excellent, particularly in the tech
nical and trouble reporting - corrective action areas*

In conclusion, although at the time of this writing the proof of perform
ance is yet to come, it is felt that the enormous increase of attention to de
tails, the "tender loving care 11 , the many disciplines added, the competence of
personnel, etc*, will all contribute to a program which may well serve as a
model for future manned space efforts*
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